The implications of North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities present a threat not just to the United States, but to the entire world. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mathis declared on November 26th, 2017 that North Korea has the missile capability to “threaten everywhere in the world, basically”[1]. Depending on a variety of estimates, North Korea currently holds 20 to 60 nuclear weapons, while the United States has more than 1,500 currently deployed, as well as thousands more in storage. North Korea’s long-range ICBMs could theoretically reach major cities in East Asia and the United States, and they have shown no intention of slowing their nuclear development programs. Experts have acknowledged that North Korean disarmament will not happen anytime soon, as they have an active program to construct nuclear weapons using Highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is concealable and very easily produced.

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The issue of North Korean nuclear armament is far from solved. United States Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson recently acknowledged that getting North Korea to completely disarm is nearly impossible, and the Kim regime has rejected any talks that involve giving up their nuclear arsenal[2]. The United States has thus far decided to respond to the threat of North Korea’s nuclear developments by using a strategy of nuclear deterrence, although the state of extended nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia lacks nuclear sharing agreements and there are no elaborate consultations on how and when U.S. nuclear weapons might be employed in the case of a North Korean nuclear attack. This memorandum will outline a proposed path of action regarding the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons following the liberal perspective of international relations.

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Recommendation from a Liberal Perspective

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My recommendation for the establishment of stability in Northeast Asia, with the goal of nuclear disarmament in North Korea, focuses on four aspects of foreign policy action: patience, counter-proliferation and economic sanctions, negotiation and diplomacy, and humanitarian aid.

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Patience

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Mr. President, your war of words with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will do nothing to further America’s goal of nuclear disarmament in North Korea. Your insults of North Korea’s supreme leader, which consist of labeling him a “madman” and “Little Rocket Man” in your tweets while stating that threats to the U.S. “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen” will only exacerbate conflict, whether it be with the U.S. or its close allies in the region, South Korea and Japan[3]. Patience is of the utmost importance in any negotiation, and as a successful businessman you must understand this. Decades of U.S. diplomacy in Northeast Asia have shown that, with time, steady negotiation can lead to breakthroughs in foreign relations. The alternative to this strategy, which would involve pushing the North Korean regime into collapse through military action, would only trigger counterbalancing forces in the region, such as China, to keep the regime afloat with backdoor economic and military support. Moreover, a military operation is not guaranteed to succeed and would be extremely costly if it escalated into all-out war. With little information on the locations of North Korea’s nuclear stockpiles and development facilities, strikes on the known compounds such as the nuclear complex in Yongbyon would not guarantee that all nuclear weapons and programs are eliminated. Furthermore, a strike opens up the possibility of a second-strike attack of an American city by the remaining North Korean weapons. The fact that the United States has stockpiled a frightening nuclear arsenal discourages war with North Korea and encourages caution, which, with patience, has the potential to lead to constructive negotiation with North Korea.

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Counter-Proliferation and Economic Sanctions

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Your administration must continue to pursue policies of counter-proliferation and financial sanctions implemented by Barack Obama. The Obama administration oversaw the creation of the U.N.-backed international regime of sanctions against North Korea based on Security Council Resolution 1874. This resolution, adopted unanimously by the U.N. Security Council in 2009, imposes economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea and encourages U.N. member states to search North Korean cargo.[4] This resolution has led to the seizure of North Korean weapon shipments, some of which were nuclear, bound for Iran, Pakistan, and Central Africa.[5] Economic sanctions under Resolution 1874, if enforced correctly, are estimated by the Hyundai Economic Research Institute to cost North Korea between $1.5 to $3.7 billion.[6] These efforts to curb North Korean trade must continue, with an emphasis on closing loopholes that allow North Korea to receive intermediate goods for production of more missiles and the development of more plutonium and uranium based nuclear weapons.

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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is another multilateral institution dedicated to stopping the movement of weapons and component parts at ports or in transit[7]. Involving more than ninety countries, the PSI should continue to focus on North Korea as one of its main targets, while aiming to improve cooperation from China and the closing off of Chinese and Russian airspace to suspected North Korean cargo flights. On top of these improvements, the United States should engage with potential customers and secondary facilitators of North Korean commodities and warn them that further transactions with North Korea will result in sanctions. Financial sanctions that have targeted North Korean leadership and economic development have proven to be effective, forcing the North Korean leadership to search for new ways to circumvent the sanctions. These sanctions, along with a strong stance that they will not be lifted until North Korea dismantles its nuclear program, will convey the message to North Korean leadership that the costs of their nuclear program carry long-lasting economic punishments that far outweigh the benefits of maintaining such a program. Designed for counter-proliferation, these sanctions should remain in place for as long as North Korea has nuclear weapons, and should only be lifted when North Korea has been rid of nuclear weapons.

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Negotiation and Diplomacy

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While sanctions are means of slowing North Korea’s proliferation and development of nuclear weapons, they do not de-nuclearize North Korea. Thus, negotiation, however hard it may be to envision with the erratic Kim Jong-un, is necessary to complete America’s goals in North Korea. While it is unlikely that North Korea surrenders its nuclear arsenal quickly, through hardline negotiation in the face of increasingly punishing sanctions, Kim Jong-un will cede to America’s demands. Nuclear negotiations have proven to be fruitful in Northeast Asia already; the negotiations leading up to the 1994 nuclear agreement successfully put a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear operations, and the Six-Party Talks agreements of 2005 and 2007 led to the partial dismantlement of its nuclear programs[8]. Negotiation with North Korea will not be easy, and nuclear disarmament won’t be the first agreement reached, but through continued negotiation will come progress towards complete dismantlement.

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Perhaps even more important than negotiation with North Korea is diplomacy with North Korea’s neighbors, particularly China and South Korea. Each one of these nations have varying preferences and desires, thus making negotiations with all nations in the region extremely complicated. China has provided support to North Korea since the Korean War, and has been reluctant to harshen sanctions due to the fear of a nuclear accident or another famine causing a heavy inflow of North Korean refugees into China[9]. China’s economic ties to North Korea may be the leverage necessary to disarm North Korea, as China sustains nearly all of North Korean economic activity[10]. Using a “naming and shaming” technique against Chinese entities, the U.S. can pressure China into stopping its economic activity which has propped up Kim Jong-un’s regime. South Korea shares China’s fear of incoming refugees and has pushed to stabilize the humanitarian situation in North Korea, but does not want the U.S. or another foreign power intervening without its consent[11]. Thus, negotiations with North Korea’s neighboring states presents a balancing act of sorts, but with America’s power and diplomatic history, agreement among the nations is never out of reach.

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Humanitarian Aid

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While nuclear disarmament is justifiably at the top of America’s goals in North Korea, upon reaching this landmark occasion a new crisis is bound to arise. With the collapse of the regime, one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world will be revealed. Little is understood of the full scope of the lives of the hundreds of thousands of impoverished North Koreans living under Kim Jong-un’s oppressive regime. The U.S. must be ready to provide a refugee a human rights envoy, resettlement programs, food and medical aid, and advocacy networks to allow defectors’ stories to be broadcast to the world. It is vital that any policy following North Korean disarmament focus on increasing the flow of information from the outside world into North Korea. On top of imprisoning, punishing, and starving its people, Kim Jong-un’s regime has attempted to control the minds of the people by disconnecting them with the outside world and brainwashing them with carefully selected propaganda. Kim’s regime is only as strong as its ability to control knowledge, which enables the regime to stand on its ideology. Without control of information, there is no ideology, and with no ideology there is no North Korea as we know it.

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Liberal Opinion

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The series of steps proposed in my recommendation are in line with the liberal theory of international relations. The suggested sanctions promote diplomatic rather than military solutions to international problems, and by pursuing incremental pressures upon North Korea to surrender its nuclear arsenal, eventually the cost of the sanctions will exceed the benefit of having nuclear weapons. By altering the cost-benefit analysis of North Korea, sanctions will lead to a victory for diplomacy. By taking progressive domestic ideas such as free trade, open agreements, democracy, reduction of armaments and the importance of humanitarian aid and implementing them abroad, my recommendation aligns with the core tenets of liberal thought[12]. This policy recommendation falls in line with the ideals of influential liberal U.S. Presidents like Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, who preached the importance of using government power for humane and just reasons. Dismantling North Korea’s nuclear stockpile and providing aid to the oppressed North Korean population qualifies as a morally just use of power. To paraphrase Carter himself, this policy is derived from a larger view of global change, rooted in American values, reinforced by our material wealth and military power, and designed to serve mankind.[13] 

 

Realist Critique of the Liberal Recommendation

      

The realist theory of international relations provides explanations for North Korea’s desire to develop a nuclear weapons program. Realist theory encompasses three key principles that can be applied to the situation in North Korea: survival, self-help, and statism[14]. However, North Korea’s increased security by way of nuclear weapons only decreases the security of all other nations in the region according to the security dilemma. Offensive and defensive realists have different perspectives on power and security: offensive realists believe that the safest way to ensure a state’s survival is by being the most powerful, whereas defensive realists believe that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate policies to attain security[15].

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North Korea is first and foremost concerned with its survival, and nuclear weapons are their main strategy for ensuring the survival of the state. Without the threat of North Korea firing nuclear weapons aimed at the United States or one of America’s allies, North Korea would likely have been invaded long ago using conventional military forces. Without the ability or resources to hold a large conventional standing army, nuclear weapons provide North Korea with the protection that it otherwise would lack. Realists believe that states operate according to their own self-interest, and will act only in situations that improve their relative power[16]. Obtaining nuclear weapons increases North Korea’s relative power in the region, and without them, North Korea would have no leverage in negotiations or international politics. Realists also argue that all states in the same position act similarly, signifying that if a state can construct nuclear weapons and facilities, it should and will[17]. With the spread of information comes the spread of technology, and eventually, under the assumption that all states who can develop nuclear weapons will, the proliferation of nuclear technology. Thus, it makes sense that North Korea would want nuclear weapons, as any state in their situation would do the same. If the United States were in the same situation, realists would expect our great nation to seek maximum assurances of protection, and seeing that no other states can be relied on to guarantee a state’s survival, the development of our own nuclear weapons would bring that security. With North Korea being bordered by states it does not trust, chiefly Japan, Russia, and South Korea, and with United States to the East, nuclear weapons are their primary source of protection and leverage.

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From the perspective of the United States and its allies, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons represent a threat to our security. Since eliminating all land-based nuclear weapons from Northeast Asia in 1991, the U.S. has maintained a declaratory policy of providing a nuclear umbrella to Japan and South Korea as well as the capability to deploy nuclear weapons in a time of crisis[18]. With China becoming increasingly militarized, an offensive realist would argue that the U.S. should abandon its nuclear umbrella policy in favor of placing nuclear warheads in South Korea and Japan. Both North Korea and China are militarily assertive at the conventional level while avoiding outright war, and China’s expansionist policies increase Japan and South Korea’s fear of American abandonment in the region. To avoid a situation in which Japan and South Korea begin to construct their own nuclear weapons to ensure their own security, an offensive realist would argue that the United States should provide nuclear weapons to these nations to ensure America’s influence and power in the region. Not only would this strategy increase diplomatic ties with Japan and South Korea, but it would also put pressure on China and North Korea to slow their military expansionism. Offensive realists argue that the goal of great powers like the United States is to become the hegemonic status-quo power that can dictate the realities of global politics, and by increasing America’s nuclear presence in the region, they can increase their relative power[19]. Thus, offensive realists would critique the liberal argument for patience by arguing that the more time the U.S. waits to act, the more time time North Korea and China have to increase their influence and militaristic role in the region.

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A defensive realist would argue that the current policy of nuclear deterrence is satisfactory, and that putting more nuclear weapons in the region would lead to a security dilemma, decreasing the security of all northeast Asian states. Defensive realists believe that more power is not necessarily better, and that security can be reached through moderate and reserved policies[20]. Aggressive expansion heightens the security dilemma and decreases the state’s security by upsetting the tendency of states to conform to international norms.

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One of the key principles of realism is the belief that the international system is anarchic, with no central authority capable of regulating interactions between states[21]. Thus, international politics is a struggle for power between self-interested states, with no central authority regulating interactions between states. Under this belief, the U.N.-backed international regime of sanctions against North Korea based on Security Council Resolution 1874 is baseless, and only represents the underlying relationships of power between U.N. states while having no independent effect on state behavior. In addition to this belief, realists would also argue that economic sanctions have little effect on North Korea’s nuclear development. Realists contend that concerns of national security are much more vital than concerns of economic vitality, especially in the case of North Korea, which has maintained their nuclear arsenal despite the already harsh sanctions placed upon them. Kim Jong-un’s regime considers international trade as more of a threat than a benefit, thus minimizing the effects of economic sanctions. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has already cut economic ties with North Korea, has stated that North Koreans “would rather eat grass” than fold due to the pressure of economic sanctions[22]. Economic management is not North Korea’s strong suit, and under the Kim family’s regime, North Korea’s trade and economic output have diminished while the standard of living of the majority of the nation has fallen precipitously. The country’s nuclear weapons program is the only thing keeping North Korea relevant in the international community, and it won’t surrender that due to a minor inconvenience in trade. With the attention given to North Korea by Western nations, their possession of nuclear weapons has vindicated their standing as a player in the international community. All signs point to the fact that Kim Jong-un believes that nuclear weaponry is North Korea’s path to prominence, and that economic sanctions will have no effect on a nation that already avoids economic interdependence and trade with countries it distrusts.

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On the topic of human rights and humanitarian aid, realists believe that nations only address human rights violations when it’s either cost-free to that nation or when human rights issues are invoked to undermine an adversary[23]. A realist would thus argue that the United States is only focusing on North Korean human rights violations in order to undermine their threatening nuclear weapons program. Under this assumption, the United States does not care about the plights of the impoverished North Korea population, and is only using these issues as a façade for their intentions to disarm North Korea.

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Liberal Rebuttal of the Realist Critique

 

The realist assumption that all nations that have the ability to produce nuclear weapons will produce nuclear weapons is built on faulty logic that ignores the power of international norms and recent history of nuclear proliferation. As the graph below shows, only about one-fifth of states that have the ability to build nuclear weapons have actually constructed a nuclear arsenal. On top of that, the pace of nuclear proliferation has remained nearly unchanged since the nuclear hysteria of the Cold War[24].

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This lack of nuclear proliferation is largely due to the presence of strong international norms against the use of nuclear weapons as well as the presence of international organizations that monitor and punish violators. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enforced in 1970 and extended indefinitely in 1995, is an agreement of non-nuclear states not to acquire nuclear weapons and is adhered to by 191 nations[25]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957,  shares the NPT’s goal of nuclear disarmament and reports to the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council[26]. Together, the NPT and IAEA have changed the context in which states pursue nuclear interests by providing transparency, reassuring nuclear-abstaining states that other states will not obtain nuclear weapons, and establishing standards for punishing violators. Due to the presence of these agreements and the increasing realization that no good can come from the possession of nuclear weapons, proliferation of nuclear weapons has become a rarity.

 

Thus, in contrast with realist arguments, state security comes not from the possession of nuclear weapons, but from the knowledge that other states do not have nuclear weapons. Most nations want to be viewed as upstanding members of the international community, thus depressing the desire for nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies do not want to disarm North Korea to increase their individual security and relative power, but to increase the safety of the entire world[27]. An example of international norms affecting a state’s decision to develop their nuclear capabilities is Ukraine, which surrendered its nuclear arsenal in 1992 so as not be seen as a rogue state in the realm of Iran and North Korea. This also presents an argument against the suggested realist action of supplying South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons. In doing so, both nations would need to withdraw from the NPT, which only one nation has ever done: North Korea. Such a move would tarnish the international reputations of these nations and add unneeded unpredictability and instability to the region, with the potential for this move to trigger a nuclear arms race with China or a nuclear attack by North Korea. It’s likely that threats of nuclear development in South Korea and Japan are a negotiation tactic aimed at putting pressure on China to cut economic support to North Korea. In regards to the realist argument that economic sanctions will have little effect on North Korea’s stance on its nuclear arsenal, there is historical precedent that demonstrates the effect of China severing economic ties with North Korea. In 2003, China suspended oil deliveries for several days, and North Korea quickly began negotiations[28]. If the U.S. is able to push China to limit or decrease its trade with North Korea, the effect of the sanctions will be felt immediately in North Korea.

 

The realist argument that international intervention over human rights issues is only to undermine its adversary is similarly flawed, as it would behoove not only the United States but indeed the rest of the developed world to aid in the humanitarian efforts in North Korea. In the case of a regime change and disarmament in North Korea, international organizations would provide much needed humanitarian support to the starving masses in North Korea. According to the democratic peace theory, no two democratic nations have ever gone to war, and these humanitarian efforts would be the first step towards the democratization of North Korea, which would eventually lead to the removal of sanctions and the re-integration of North Korea into the international system of trade and diplomacy[29].

 

 

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Bibliography

 

           

“Jimmy Carter: Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame - May 22, 1977.” The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7552.

 

 (IAEA), International Atomic Energy Agency. “Official Web Site of the IAEA.” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1 Jan. 1970, www.iaea.org/.

 

Cohen, Zachary, et al. “New missile test shows North Korea capable of hitting all of US mainland.” CNN, Cable News Network, 30 Nov. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/11/28/politics/north-korea-missile-launch/index.html.

 

Hamedy, Saba. “All the times Trump has insulted North Korea.” CNN, Cable News Network, 1 Dec. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-insults-timeline/index.html.

Hymans, Jacques E. C. The psychology of nuclear proliferation: identity, emotions, and foreign policy. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

 

Kier, Elizabeth. “Realism: Power and Anarchy.” 8 Jan. 2018.

 

Kier, Elizabeth. “Liberalism: Part I.” 17 Jan. 2018.

 

Kier, Elizabeth. “Nuclear Proliferation: Why the Bomb?” 26 Feb. 2018.

 

Neuman, Scott. “Putin: North Korea Would 'Eat Grass' Before Giving Up Nukes.” NPR, NPR, 5 Sept. 2017, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/05/548676414/putin-north-korea-would-eat-grass-before-giving-up-nukes.

 

“Proliferation Security Initiative.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.

 

Sanger, David E. “A Tillerson Slip Offers a Peek Into Secret Planning on North Korea.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 17 Dec. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/us/politics/tillerson-north-korea-china.html.

 

“Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm.

 

“Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm.

 

“The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program.

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.

 

Watts, Jonathan. “China cuts oil supply to North Korea.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 31 Mar. 2003, www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/01/northkorea.china.

 

“What to Know About the Sanctions on North Korea.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea.

 

 

 

 

[1] Cohen, Zachary, et al. “New missile test shows North Korea capable of hitting all of US mainland.” CNN, Cable News Network, 30 Nov. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/11/28/politics/north-korea-missile-launch/index.html.

[2] Sanger, David E. “A Tillerson Slip Offers a Peek Into Secret Planning on North Korea.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 17 Dec. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/us/politics/tillerson-north-korea-china.html.

[3] Hamedy, Saba. “All the times Trump has insulted North Korea.” CNN, Cable News Network, 1 Dec. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-insults-timeline/index.html.

[4] “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm.

[5] Ibid.

[6]“What to Know About the Sanctions on North Korea.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea.

[7] “Proliferation Security Initiative.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.

[8] “The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program.

[9] Cha, Victor D. “The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future.” New York: Ecco, 2012. Print.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Kier, Elizabeth. “Liberalism: Part I.” 17 Jan. 2018.

[13] “Jimmy Carter: Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame - May 22, 1977.” The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7552.

[14] Kier, Elizabeth. “Realism: Power and Anarchy.” 8 Jan. 2018.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Cha, Victor D. “The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future.” New York: Ecco, 2012. Print.

[19] Kier, Elizabeth. “Realism: Power and Anarchy.” 8 Jan. 2018.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Neuman, Scott. “Putin: North Korea Would 'Eat Grass' Before Giving Up Nukes.” NPR, NPR, 5 Sept. 2017, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/05/548676414/putin-north-korea-would-eat-grass-before-giving-up-nukes.

[23] Kier, Elizabeth. “Realism: Power and Anarchy.” 8 Jan. 2018.

[24] Hymans, Jacques E. C. The psychology of nuclear proliferation: identity, emotions, and foreign policy. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

[25] “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.

[26] (IAEA), International Atomic Energy Agency. “Official Web Site of the IAEA.” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1 Jan. 1970, www.iaea.org/

[27] Kier, Elizabeth. “Nuclear Proliferation: Why the Bomb?” 26 Feb. 2018.

[28] Watts, Jonathan. “China cuts oil supply to North Korea.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 31 Mar. 2003, www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/01/northkorea.china.

[29] Kier, Elizabeth. “Liberalism: Part I.” 17 Jan. 2018.

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PS 321 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

This course examines the sources of American foreign policy. We begin by reviewing how two dominant approaches to international relations, Realism and Liberalism, explain U.S. foreign policy. We then use these approaches to examine pivotal events, actors, and developments in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. The first section looks at two crucial questions about the Cold War: why it ended and its consequences for the American state (and U.S. foreign policy). The second section examines two prominent issues in the immediate post-Cold War period that continue to shape U.S. foreign policy today: NATO expansion and humanitarian intervention. We then explore the role of nuclear weapons: their effect on foreign policy and the causes of nuclear proliferation. Finally, we address current issues in U.S. foreign policy, such as China’s rise and the reliance on contractors and privatized military force.

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