The Iran nuclear deal has been a divisive element of foreign policy within the international community since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was reached in 2015 between the Republic of Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the European Union. The deal has come under intense scrutiny recently, especially following the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. President Trump has labeled the deal as “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into” and throughout his campaign trail he openly divulged his plan to abandon the deal[1]. He has yet to follow through with his plan, but the next deadline to certify the deal is May 12th, and Trump’s decision could have drastic ramifications for America’s presence in the Middle East and relationship with Iran and Israel. Beyond American influence in the region, though, Trump’s choice could also impact the direction of foreign and domestic policy in Israel and Iran, whose contentious relationship has the potential to erupt into military conflict. The Iran nuclear deal is a complicated agreement that combines a number of foreign policy goals, domestic agendas, and international norms into a comprehensive agreement. To completely understand the political, economic, social, and even religious motivations behind the deal, we must first analyze the framework of the deal as it was negotiated in 2015. This essay will evaluate the statements and actions made by the Obama Administration and Iranian and Israeli leadership leading up to and following the completion of the deal to develop an understanding of the motives and goals of these major actors involved in the negotiating process.

           The intention of the Iran nuclear deal was to reverse Iran’s progress in its development of nuclear capabilities and to ensure that Iran will be unable to amass a nuclear arsenal for at least a generation. The deal reconfigures Iran’s nuclear program so that the nation cannot amass enough bomb-grade uranium for one weapon in less than 12 months over a period of 13 or more years, accomplishing this goal by reducing the number of installed centrifuges from almost 20,000 to 6,104[2]. Under the deal, only 5,060 centrifuges would be allowed to enrich uranium and to more than than 3.67% uranium-235, the only naturally occurring fissile isotope which is widely used in nuclear power plants and weapons[3]. The underground Fordow enrichment site in Iran was also repurposed into a medical isotope production facility where no uranium can be present for 15 years[4]. A limit was also placed on Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium for 15 years and Iran was forced to to accept very stringent limits on its advanced centrifuge research and development over the following decade[5]. To ensure that Iran adheres to the outlined restrictions, a comprehensive inspection schedule and monitoring regime was ratified that practically ensure that any attempts by Iran to develop nuclear weapons would be detected promptly and would be met with a strong reaction from the international community. In return for adhering to the agreement, crippling economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, United States, and the European Union on Iran were lifted. These sanctions had cost Iran more than $160 billion in oil revenue from 2012 to 2016, and the deal unfroze more than $100 billion in assets frozen overseas while allowing Iran to resume selling oil on international markers and to use the global financial system for trade[6]. The deal also stipulated that should Iran violate any of the above aspects of the deal, the United Nations sanctions will automatically be reinforced for a period of 10 years. In eliminating Iran’s potential for nuclear development while lifting the debilitating economic sanctions on Iran’s economy, it seems on the surface that each side benefits from the deal. But since the implementation of the agreement, complaints have surfaced from all sides of the negotiating table, leading to much debate over whether the deal is satisfactory to all parties involved.

           Iran was practically forced into the nuclear deal through the harsh economic sanctions that ravaged the Iranian economy for years. Throughout the negotiation process, Iranian officials sought to portray the dispute as a matter of justice and fairness. They argued that Iran had no choice to conduct nuclear development because the United States and Israel were illegally sabotaging Iran’s declared activities, all the while insisting that all countries have the “right” to enrich uranium and that the United States and its allies were engaging in neocolonial nuclear repression[7]. Iranian officials also pointed to the fact that the United States and its allies pursued a double-standard of nuclear proliferation, choosing to be strict with Iran and lenient with countries like Israel, which has not admitted to having nuclear weapons but likely does[8]. Iran views the United Nations Security Council and the P5+1, the five permanent members of the security council with veto power, as reflecting underlying relationships of power in the international system rather than an unbiased organization seeking absolute fairness and compliance with the NPT. By forcing Iran to comply with their standards of non-proliferation, the Security Council fortified their place as international lawmakers and world powers that can dictate the actions of other states within the international community, even when it violates norms of national sovereignty. From an Iranian perspective, it appears as though the primary objective of the deal for the United States was to maintain a balance of power and deterrence in the Middle East to ensure Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Similarly, the United States’ dedication to non-proliferation has been questioned as Iran has not been invited to any nuclear-security summits, which impose commitments on Iran without offering the nation any privileges. All the while, the United States, China, and Russia have been strengthening their nuclear arsenals, lending credence to Iranian theories that the Power 5 are trying to cement their status as the nuclear judge and jury of the international community.

           Through its economic might and political clout within the international system, the United States forced Iran to choose between its nuclear weapons program and economic viability. Despite high oil prices providing a steady inflow of capital into Iran, the country is still desperate for Western investment as corruption is making the effects of the oil revenue on the economy negligible. Despite the limits placed on Iranian nuclear development, Iran was not forced to completely relinquish enrichment activities and capabilities[9]. Thus, through the deal, Iran won the right to enrichment, while the international community gained the ability to control the scale and scope of these activities along with far-reaching verification and monitoring capabilities. Iran paid an enormous price to maintain this capability, as their economy lost hundreds of billions in dollars in revenue and the country was politically ostracized by the international community. The fact that Iran was able to bargain for the ability to continue its uranium enrichment capabilities qualifies as a small win. And despite the loss of their ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, the Iran nuclear deal does not address Iran’s ballistic missile program, its poor human rights record, and its support for terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It can thus be argued that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei received more tangible gains than the other states involved in the negotiating process. Iran’s struggling economy was relinquished from the harsh economic sanctions imposed on the nation, giving Iran the potential to grow into a formidable power in the Middle East. Looking at the big picture, Iran’s sacrifice of its nuclear development could be well worth the increased economic and diplomatic abilities granted through the deal.

           Israel’s historical experiences of persecution and conflict with Arab states, especially Palestine, have created a sense of insecurity embedded within every Israeli. Thus, Israel’s security concerns are placed at the center of its foreign and domestic policy. Israel’s contentious relationship with Iran is well-known and Israel has long considered Iran to be a credible threat to its national security. As Obama stated when announcing the completion of the Iran nuclear deal, “no one can blame Israelis for having a deep skepticism about any dealings with a government like Iran’s – which includes leaders who have denied the Holocaust, embrace an ideology of anti-Semitism, [and] facilitate the flow of rockets that are arrayed on Israel’s borders”[10]. Many Israeli leaders and officials view Iran as a radical revolutionary state concealing aspirations of regional hegemony, using anti-Israel rhetoric to strengthen Iran’s legitimacy among Arab states. There are many reasons for Israel’s desire to de-nuclearize Iran, yet Israeli leadership, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have argued that the nuclear deal is not harsh enough on Iran. Despite the disagreements between the United States and Israel over the specifics of the deal, the agreement still helps to accomplish some of Israel’s foreign policy goals.

           Israel’s primary concern is the security of the Jewish state, and Israeli leaders worried that Iranian nuclear weapons would provide cover for Iran and its allies to target Israel with military force. This worry is often expressed by referencing Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist political party and militant group based in Lebanon. Many Israeli’s believe that Hezbollah has limited its aggression towards Israel due to the fear of of a retaliatory Israeli strike on the Lebanese capital of Beirut[11]. However, this fear may be overblown, as Israel has not shown the willingness to use its alleged nuclear arsenal, and even the Iranian possession of nuclear weapons is likely not enough to sway Israel to strike first. Adding to the security concerns involved in Iran’s nuclear program, Israel also worried that the Iran nuclear program would lead to greater regional alignment with Iran, trigger a wave of nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East, and further erode American influence in the region, severely endangering Israel’s safety and impact in their neighborhood. The nightmare scenario imagined by many in Israel is one in which Arab resistance to Iran dissipates as fears of Iranian power and retaliation capabilities increases. This scenario would destroy the alliance between Israel and pro-Western Arab states that have offered resistance to Iranian influence in the Middle East. This series of events would also have the possibility of continuing the decline of American influence in the Middle East, especially after its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. A lessened American military presence in the region would potentially lead to a spike in militant extremist groups like ISIS and the further erosion of Israeli security.

           While the Iran nuclear deal reduces Israeli concerns of an Iranian missile strike, Israeli apprehension over a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East still exists. Israel worries that the removal of economic sanctions on Iran will lead to their economic and political empowerment in the region and increased aggression towards their ideological enemies in Israel, especially as the United States continues to curtail their presence in the region. Israel is less concerned with an Iranian attack than it is over losing influence in the region, and the Iran nuclear deal only advances Iran’s economic and diplomatic agendas, which could come at the cost of Israel’s military and political maneuverability in the Middle East. 

           In crafting the Iran nuclear deal, it is apparent that the United States valued a guarantee of security over influence, and that the United States is not worried about an economically and politically resurgent Iran. As Obama stated following the implementation of the deal, despite Israel not getting everything out of the deal that they had hoped, “a nuclear-armed Iran is far more dangerous to Israel, to America, and to the world than an Iran that benefits from sanctions relief”[12]. American motivations for the Iran nuclear deal focus primarily on concerns of domestic security, the security of their allies, and nuclear proliferation within the Middle East. Nuclear terrorism was identified as a principal concern of the United States at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April of 2010, at which Obama stated that access to nuclear weapons by terrorist groups was “the biggest single biggest threat to U.S. security, both short-term, medium-term, and long-term”[13]. Thus, the deal was deemed a success by President Obama, with the President stating that under the deal, “Iran will not get its hands on a nuclear bomb” and that “the region, the United States, and the world will be more secure”[14]. There are potentially ulterior motives for the United States’ pursuit of the Iran nuclear deal. The United States has preached the importance of non-proliferation to ensure the security of the international community, but it may have exaggerated the issue of nuclear terrorism in Iran to accomplish American foreign policy objectives. By raising concerns over terrorism in connection with nuclear development in nations that are not allied with the United States, America is able to rally the support of its allies to halt this nuclear development and maximize the world powers’ monopoly over nuclear arsenals. An argument can be made that the West use issues of nuclear terrorism to divert attention away from complete nuclear disarmament and Western control over nuclear power.

           As stated by President Obama, “this deal ultimately must be judged by what it achieves on the central goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon”[15]. The deal is focused on one thing and one thing only: halting Iran’s nuclear development programs. Despite Israeli worries over growing Iranian influence because of the deal, it’s apparent that the United States and the rest of the P5 valued a guarantee of security over balance of power considerations, and that Iran valued its economic and political maneuverability over its nuclear weapons program. The future of this deal remains to be seen in this unpredictable time in world politics, and while the motivations for every nation present at the negotiating table are clear, the ramifications that the Iran nuclear deal will have on the world are yet to be seen in their full potential.

 

 

Works Cited:

 

Barzegar, Kayhan. “Nuclear Terrorism: An Iranian Perspective.” Middle East Policy Council, www.mepc.org/nuclear-terrorism-iranian-perspective.

 

Ben-Meir, Alon. “ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR IRAN.” International Journal on World Peace, vol. 27, no. 1, 2010, pp. 61–78. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20752917.

 

Davenport, Kelsey. “Iran Nuclear Deal Implemented.” Arms Control Today, vol. 46, no. 2, 2016, pp. 48–49., www.jstor.org/stable/43746395.

 

Gaouette, Nicole. “Pompeo Says Trump Likely to Leave Iran Nuclear Agreement.” CNN, Cable News Network, 27 Apr. 2018, www.cnn.com/2018/04/27/politics/pompeo-iran-north-korea-presser/index.html.

 

Kaye, Dalia Dassa, et al. “Israeli Perceptions of and Policies Toward Iran.” Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA, 2011, pp. 19–54. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd.8.

 

Kimball, Daryl G. “FOCUS: Why Congress Should Support the Iran Deal.” Arms Control Today, vol. 45, no. 7, 2015, pp. 3–3. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24573777.

 

Lebovic, James H. “Red Lines and Green Lights: Iran, Nuclear Arms Control, and Nonproliferation.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 1, 2016, pp. 10–42. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26271086.

 

Perkovich, George. “LOOKING BACK: Compliance Versus Bargaining: An Implication of the Iran Nuclear Deal.” Arms Control Today, vol. 46, no. 8, 2016, pp. 32–35., www.jstor.org/stable/24878132.

 

Rouhani, Hassab. “Statement to the UN General Assembly.” New York, September 24, 2013, https://gadebate.un.org/68/iran islamic-republic

 

“Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 Aug. 2015, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.

 

Shank, Gregory. “Anatomy of a Done Deal: The Fight over the Iran Nuclear Accord.” Social Justice, vol. 42, no. 1 (139), 2015, pp. 1–18., www.jstor.org/stable/24871309.

 

Staff, NPR. “Transcript: Trump's Remarks On Iran Nuclear Deal.” NPR, NPR, 13 Oct. 2017, www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557622096/transcript-trump-s-remarks-on-iran-nuclear-deal.

 

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[1] Staff, NPR. “Transcript: Trump's Remarks On Iran Nuclear Deal.” NPR, NPR, 13 Oct. 2017, www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557622096/transcript-trump-s-remarks-on-iran-nuclear-deal.

[2] Perkovich, George. “LOOKING BACK: Compliance Versus Bargaining: An Implication of the Iran Nuclear Deal.” Arms Control Today, vol. 46, no. 8, 2016, pp. 32–35., www.jstor.org/stable/24878132.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Lebovic, James H. “Red Lines and Green Lights: Iran, Nuclear Arms Control, and Nonproliferation.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 1, 2016, pp. 10–42. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26271086.

[7] Hassan Rouhani, Statement to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 24, 2013, https://gadebate.un.org/68/iran islamic-republic

[8] Barzegar, Kayhan. “Nuclear Terrorism: An Iranian Perspective.” Middle East Policy Council, www.mepc.org/nuclear-terrorism-iranian-perspective.

[9] Kaye, Dalia Dassa, et al. “Israeli Perceptions of and Policies Toward Iran.” Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA, 2011, pp. 19–54. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd.8.

[10] “Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration

[11] Kaye, Dalia Dassa, et al. “Israeli Perceptions of and Policies Toward Iran.” Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry

[12]Davenport, Kelsey. “Iran Nuclear Deal Implemented.” Arms Control Today, vol. 46, no. 2, 2016, pp. 48–49., www.jstor.org/stable/43746395.

[13] Barzegar, Kayhan. “Nuclear Terrorism: An Iranian Perspective.” Middle East Policy Council

[14]Davenport, Kelsey. “Iran Nuclear Deal Implemented.” Arms Control Today

[15] “Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, 5 Aug. 2015, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.

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JSIS 426 WORLD POLITICS
The nation-state system and its alternatives, world distributions of preferences and power, structure of international authority, historical world societies and their politics.relationship of Greece to the EU; the Macedonia question; immigration and minority rights; the 2004 Olympic Games; the debate over the Parthenon marbles; the Greek debt crisis; Grexit; the rise of the Golden Dawn, and the refugee crisis.

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